2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-3-2011

Ramon Prestol Espinal v. Atty Gen USA

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

Recommended Citation
"Ramon Prestol Espinal v. Atty Gen USA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 606.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/606

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________
No. 10-1473
________

RAMON JULIO PRESTOL ESPINAL,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A 024-502-326)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling
______
Argued April 27, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
and POLLAK,* District Judge
(Filed: August 3, 2011 )
______
Jacqueline Brown Scott (Argued)
San Francisco, CA 94121
*

Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
sitting by designation.

Attorney for Petitioner
Eric H. Holder
Yanal H. Yousef (Argued)
Thomas W. Hussey
Ann C. Varnon
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
Washington, DC 20044
Attorneys for Respondent
Beth J. Werlin (Argued)
American Immigration Council
Washington, DC 20005
Trina A. Realmuto
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild
Boston, MA 02108
Attorneys for Amicus-Petitioner
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Ramon Prestol Espinal (referred to by the parties as
Prestol) petitions for review of the decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) that it lacked jurisdiction over
Prestol‘s motion to reconsider the BIA‘s denial of relief
because Prestol had been removed from the United States.
Prestol‘s petition requires us to decide whether the Attorney
General‘s regulation barring aliens who have been removed
from the United States from filing a motion to reconsider
and/or reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), otherwise known as the
post-departure bar, is inconsistent with the Illegal
2

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (―IIRIRA‖), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (7)(A), which
specifically grants an alien the right to file one motion to
reconsider and one motion to reopen without any geographic
limitation on that right.
I.1
Prestol was born in the Dominican Republic but lived
in the United States from 1982 until 2009. In January 2009,
the Department of Homeland Security (―DHS‖) charged
Prestol with being removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (―INA‖) as an alien
present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled. In February 2009, DHS also charged him pursuant to
sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i) and (a)(2)(B) of the INA with being
removable as an alien convicted of an offense relating to a
controlled substance and an alien convicted of two or more
offenses involving crimes of moral turpitude. These charges
of removability were based on Prestol‘s 2004 convictions for
possession of a controlled substance and violating a protective
order.
In April 2009, Prestol admitted the factual allegations
underlying his notice to appear and was found removable as
charged. However, Prestol applied for asylum, withholding
of removal and Convention Against Torture (―CAT‖)
protection alleging that because of his previous assistance to
the Drug Enforcement Agency he would be targeted for
violence by drug dealers if he returned to the Dominican
Republic. On June 23, 2009, the Immigration Judge (―IJ‖)
denied Prestol‘s applications for relief. On November 3,
2009, the BIA affirmed the IJ and twenty-one days later,
November 24, 2009, Prestol was removed from the United
1

Neither the merits of Prestol‘s motion for
reconsideration nor his underlying request for relief are
before us. A brief procedural outline will therefore
suffice.
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States to the Dominican Republic. On December 3, 2009,
Prestol filed a timely motion to reconsider with the BIA. On
January 19, 2010, the BIA denied the motion to reconsider
based on what it deemed a lack of jurisdiction resulting from
Prestol‘s removal from the United States. Prestol petitions for
review of this decision.
II.2
We review the BIA‘s legal conclusions de novo. Patel
v. Att’y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010). Where an
agency‘s regulation allegedly conflicts with the governing
statute, we employ the analysis prescribed by Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The focus of Chevron is aimed at determining and giving
effect to Congress‘ ―unambiguously expressed intent.‖ Id. at
843. Under Chevron step one, ―we must first determine if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue
of law in the case, using traditional tools of statutory
construction to determine whether Congress had an intention
on the precise question at issue.‖ Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen.,
557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). If Congress‘ intent is clear, our inquiry
is at an end as the agency is required to give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842-43. If the statute is ambiguous, we move to step
two and determine if the agency‘s interpretation of the statute,
as expressed in the regulation, is reasonable and entitled to
deference. Id.
III.
A.
Before delving into the Chevron analysis, we briefly
outline the relevant statutory and regulatory framework. The
2

We have jurisdiction to review questions of law with
respect to a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a).
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regulatory right to file a motion to reopen or reconsider with
the BIA has existed since 1940. 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3504
(Sept. 4, 1940) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 90.9-90.10 (1941)).
In 1952, the Department of Justice (―DOJ‖) issued a
regulation barring the BIA from reviewing such a motion
filed by a person no longer present in the United States. 17
Fed. Reg. 11469, 11475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 6.2 (1953)).
That same year, 1952, Congress passed the McCarranWalter Act, which established the structure of current
immigration laws. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 242(c), 66 Stat. 163,
210 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1952)). In 1961,
Congress amended the law to provide courts of appeals with
jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation through a
petition for review. Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650,
651 (1961) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1962)).
However, the 1961 amendment contained a post-departure
provision paralleling the regulatory post-departure bar on
motions to reopen/reconsider. Specifically, the 1961
amendment provided: ―An order of deportation or of
exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien . . .
has departed from the United States after issuance of the
order.‖ Id. The DOJ issued implementing regulations
whereby it repromulgated the post-departure bar to motions to
reopen/reconsider. 27 Fed. Reg. 96, 96-97 (Jan. 5, 1962)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1962)). In April 1996, the DOJ
issued a regulation limiting aliens to one motion to reopen and
one motion to reconsider and providing 90 and 30 days
respectively for the alien to file each motion. 61 Fed. Reg.
18900, 18901-5 (Apr. 29, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2
(1997)).
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed IIRIRA, which
made several significant changes to immigration law. Pub L.
No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). For the first
time, Congress created a statutory right for the alien to file a
motion to reconsider and a motion to reopen with the BIA
(previously such a right existed only pursuant to regulation).
IIRIRA § 304(a)(3) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. §
5

1229a(c)(6), (7)). Congress also codified in the statute some
of the pre-existing regulatory limitations for such motions,
including the substantive requirements for motions to reopen,
the numeric limitation and time limits. Id. Notably, when
Congress enacted IIRIRA in 1996, it did not codify or adopt
the post-departure bar regulation. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554
U.S. 1, 14 (2008) (outlining the regulations IIRIRA codified).
IIRIRA also repealed the post-departure bar to judicial
review of petitions for review that Congress originally
imposed in 1961. IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612
(repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a). Additionally, Congress adopted
a 90-day period for the government to deport a person who
has been ordered removed. IIRIRA § 305(a)(3) (currently
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)).
In 1997, the DOJ promulgated regulations
implementing IIRIRA. Notwithstanding the fact that
Congress had for the first time codified the right for an alien
to file motions to reconsider and reopen with the BIA and
eliminated the post-departure bar for judicial review, the DOJ
repromulgated the post-departure bar for motions to
reconsider/reopen filed with the BIA, the regulation at issue
in this case. 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10321, 10331 (Mar. 6,
1997) (currently codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)). The postdeparture bar regulation currently provides: ―A motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on
behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her
departure from the United States. Any departure from the
United States, including the deportation or removal of a
person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or
removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal
of such motion.‖ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d).
B.
With that background before us, we move to the
Chevron statutory analysis. ―[T]he starting point for
6

interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.‖
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980). The Supreme Court has instructed that
―we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy.‖ United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49
U.S. 113, 122 (1850).
The motion to reconsider provision of IIRIRA provides
that ―[t]he alien may file one motion to reconsider a decision
that the alien is removable from the United States.‖ 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6)(A). Similarly, § 1229a(c)(7)(A) provides that
―[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings.‖ It
follows from the plain language of this statute that from the
date of the final order of removal, the alien has 30 days to
exercise his or her right to seek reconsideration and 90 days to
seek reopening. Id. § 1229a(c)(6)(B), (7)(C)(i). The INA
defines ―alien‖ broadly as ―any person not a citizen or
national of the United States.‖ INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3). To repeat, the plain text of the statute provides
each alien with the right to file one motion to reopen and one
motion to reconsider, provides time periods during which an
alien is entitled to do so, and makes no exception for aliens
who are no longer in this country.
Based on this plain language, the Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits have squarely held under Chevron that the
post-departure bar conflicts with the statutory right to file a
motion to reopen and/or reconsider.3 The Fourth Circuit held
that the regulatory post-departure bar is invalid because the
statute ―unambiguously provides an alien with the right to file
one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is within or
3

Although some of the cases discussed herein deal
with motions to reopen and this case deals with a motion
to reconsider, the analysis for each is the same and the
cases are therefore instructive. For that reason, and
because the post-departure bar to motions to reopen and
reconsider is contained in a single regulation, if it is
invalid it is invalid with respect to both kinds of motions.
7

without the country. This is so because, in providing that ‗an
alien may file,‘ the statute does not distinguish between those
aliens abroad and those within the country—both fall within
the class denominated by the words ‗an alien.‘‖ William v.
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2007).
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that ―no statute gives
the [BIA] purchase for disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain a
motion to reopen filed by aliens who have left the country.
The most relevant statute, [IIRIRA], offers nothing to support
such an interpretation of the regulation. ‗An alien,‘ it says,
‗may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section
. . . .‘ This is an empowering, not a divesting, provision, as it
grants the Board authority to entertain a motion to reopen.‖
Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir. 2011).
Consistent with its two sister courts, the Ninth Circuit
has held that the ―clear intent‖ of Congress was to provide
aliens with the right to file a motion to reopen and/or
reconsider and that the ―physical removal of [an alien] by the
United States does not preclude the [alien] from pursuing‖
that motion. Reyes-Torres v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7062, at *8 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2011) (quoting Coyt
v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010)). And over the
contrary view of his colleagues, a dissenting judge from the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that IIRIRA ―unambiguously
guarantee[s] every alien the right to file one motion to
reconsider removability and one motion to reopen removal
proceedings, regardless of whether the alien has departed
from the United States.‖ Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d
1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2009) (Lucero, J., dissenting). We
agree with these cases and adopt their analyses.
Moreover, two other circuits, including the Seventh
Circuit and, in part, the Sixth Circuit, have invalidated the
post-departure bar based on the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584,
590 (2009). See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237-40 (invalidating the
regulation based on both Chevron and Union Pacific); MarinRodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 594-95 (7th Cir. 2010)
8

(invalidating the regulation solely on Union Pacific). In
Union Pacific, the Supreme Court held that an administrative
agency cannot rely on an agency-created procedural rule to
disclaim jurisdiction—Congress alone controls the agency‘s
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
reasoned that the BIA lacked authority to disclaim jurisdiction
over the motions. 4
The Second Circuit‘s analysis in Luna v. Holder, 637
F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011), provides additional reinforcement for
the view that the post-departure bar cannot be sustained. In
that case, the court addressed whether the 30-day filing
deadline for petitions for review of BIA decisions violated the
Suspension Clause and the alien‘s right to habeas corpus. In
holding that the Suspension Clause was not violated, the court
held that the statutory motion to reopen process provides an
adequate and effective substitute for habeas so long as the
process ―cannot be unilaterally terminated by the
Government‖ pursuant to the BIA‘s post-departure bar. Id. at
87. Although the Second Circuit ―decline[d] to decide the
validity of the departure bar regulation . . . in every possible
context,‖ the court commented that the post-departure bar
―has no roots in any statutory source‖ and that ―the BIA must
consider an alien‘s motion to reopen even if the alien is no
4

Although the Supreme Court did not discuss Chevron
in Union Pacific, it is not clear to us that the Chevron
question and jurisdictional question are entirely distinct.
See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237 (―There is some question
whether Chevron applies to disputes about the scope of an
agency‘s jurisdiction.‖). In the context of this case, both
inquiries center on whether the agency has the authority to
enact a rule that prevents it from hearing motions to
reopen/reconsider and therefore both inquiries center on
Congress‘ intent. Because we decide the case based on
Chevron, we need not definitively resolve whether Union
Pacific presents a distinct question. That said, to the
extent the Sixth and Seventh Circuits found the regulation
invalid, they support our ultimate holding.
9

longer in the United States.‖ Id. at 102 (internal quotation
omitted).
Our holding that the plain text of the statute leaves no
room for the post-departure bar also finds some support in the
Supreme Court‘s decision in Dada, 554 U.S. 1. There, the
Court was asked to reconcile two provisions of IIRIRA: §
1229a(c)(7) which provides that an alien has the right to file
one motion to reopen within 90 days of the order of
deportation and § 1229c(b)(2) which requires an alien who
has been granted the right to voluntarily depart to do so within
60 days.5 If the alien does not leave within the voluntary
departure period, the alien forfeits his or her right to the full
benefits of voluntary departure (in particular, removal of the
10-year restriction on readmission). See 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(d)(1). On the other hand, if the alien departs pursuant
to the post-departure bar regulation, such departure would
have the effect of withdrawing the motion to reopen. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). Significantly, the Court noted that ―[a]
more expeditious solution to the untenable conflict between
the voluntary departure scheme and the motion to reopen
might be to permit an alien who has departed the United
States to pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture.‖ Dada,
554 U.S. at 22. However, because the post-departure
regulation was not challenged in that case (as it is here) the
Court declined to consider the regulation. Id.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court was required to
decide ―whether Congress intended the statutory right to
reopen to be qualified by the voluntary departure process.‖
Id. at 5. The government argued that by requesting voluntary
departure, the alien was knowingly surrendering the
opportunity to seek reopening. The Court rejected this
argument and instead held that the appropriate way to
reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen
5

The time limit for voluntary departure is extended to
120 days if the alien concedes removability before or
during removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A).
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provisions ―is to allow an alien to withdraw the request for
voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period‖
and file the motion to reopen. Id. at 20.
Although the holding of Dada does not directly
implicate the issue presented here, the Court‘s repeated
emphasis on the statutory right to file a motion to reopen, and
the effort of the Court to avoid abrogating that right (even in
the face of another statutory provision which conflicted),
inform our analysis. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted
that IIRIRA ―transforms the motion to reopen from a
regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to
the alien.‖ Id. at 14. It also noted that the ―statutory text is
plain insofar as it guarantees to each alien the right to file
‗one motion to reopen proceedings under this section.‘‖ Id. at
15 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)). The Court echoed its
prior admonition ―counseling long hesitation ‗before adopting
a construction of [the statute] which would, with respect to an
entire class of aliens, completely nullify a procedure so
intrinsic a part of the legislative scheme.‘‖ Id. at 18-19
(quoting Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 127-28 (1964)).6
The Court concluded that it ―must be reluctant to
assume‖ that the voluntary departure statute removed the
motion to reopen safeguard for the distinct class of deportable
aliens most favored by the same law (that is, those subject to
voluntary departure) ―particularly . . . when the plain text of
the statute reveals no such limitation.‖ Id. at 18. The Court
did not see the limitation at issue in the plain text of the
statute and refused to read one in, notwithstanding the
competing statutory and regulatory provisions. See also
Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (―The motion to
reopen is an ‗important safeguard‘ intended ‗to ensure a
proper and lawful disposition‘ of immigration proceedings.‖)
(quoting Dada, 554 U.S. at 18).
6

At argument, the government conceded that the
Supreme Court‘s emphasis on the statutory right to reopen
was, to say the least, significant.
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In sum, the Dada opinion emphasizes the importance
of the statutory right to file a motion to reopen based on the
plain text of the statute.
The government contends that nothing in the text of
the statute explicitly precludes the agency from imposing the
post-departure bar. In other words, it argues that the statute is
silent on this issue. The government supports this argument
by reliance on the Tenth Circuit decision in Rosillo-Puga, 580
F.3d 1147, the only court of appeals decision explicitly
upholding the validity of the post-departure bar. That court
held that ―the statute is simply silent on the issue of whether it
meant to repeal the post-departure bars contained in the
Attorney General‘s regulations. We certainly cannot derive a
clear meaning from the language about ‗an alien‘ or ‗the
alien‘ having the opportunity to file ‗one‘ motion for
reopening or reconsideration.‖ Id. at 1156-57.7
However, as explained by the Fourth Circuit majority
opinion in William, ―the government‘s view that Congress
was silent as to the ability of aliens outside the United States
to file motions to reopen is foreclosed by the text of the
statute. The statutory language does speak to the filing of
motions to reopen by aliens outside the country; it does so
because they are a subset of the group (i.e. ‗alien[s]‘) which it
vests with the right to file these motions.‖ 499 F.3d at 332.
The same point is made by the dissenting Tenth Circuit judge
in Rosillo-Puga: ―The language Congress chose is plain and
The dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit‘s
William decision, 499 F.3d at 336 (Williams, C.J.,
dissenting) held a similar view: ―[The statute] does not
explicitly prohibit or permit motions to reopen made
after departure. The provision simply does not speak
to that question. And it is hardly surprising that the
provision does not distinguish between classes of
aliens, for the provision‘s purpose is to limit the
number of motions to reopen that an alien may file.‖
7
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unequivocal. It draws no distinction between aliens who are
in the country and aliens who have departed. All aliens are
treated alike under the terms of [the statute], and all aliens are
guaranteed the right to file one motion to reconsider and one
motion to reopen.‖ 580 F.3d at 1162. (Lucero, J.,
dissenting).8
The government manufactures an ambiguity from
Congress‘ failure to specifically foreclose each exception that
could possibly be conjured or imagined. That approach
would create an ―ambiguity‖ in almost all statutes,
necessitating deference to nearly all agency determinations.
Nothing in the Supreme Court‘s Chevron opinion suggests
this result, which is inconsistent with traditional modes of
statutory interpretation. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n,
L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) (―the presence of some
uncertainty does not expand Chevron deference to cover
virtually any interpretation of [the statute]‖).
We have rejected similar efforts to create ambiguity.
For example, in our unanimous en banc decision in Lin8

We are not persuaded by the government‘s
contention that the First Circuit‘s decision in PenaMuriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007),
directly supports its position. In Pena-Muriel, the
court was addressing the validity of 8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(1), which bars motions to reopen with the
immigration judge post-departure, not with the BIA.
Moreover, the thrust of Pena-Muriel‘s argument was
that IIRIRA signaled Congress‘ intent to withdraw the
post-departure bar, rather than that the re-promulgated
regulation conflicted with IIRIRA. Id. at 441; see also
Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 510 F.3d 350 (1st Cir. 2007)
(denial of panel rehearing) (―[W]e did not decide
whether 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) conflicts with 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).‖). To the extent that the
decision does hold that Congress did not explicitly
address the validity of the post-departure bar, it adds
little to the Tenth Circuit‘s analysis in Rosillo-Puga.
13

Zheng, 557 F.3d at 157, we held that a provision of the INA
that granted refugee status to persons forced to undergo
sterilization or abortion was unambiguous and that the agency
interpretation permitting spouses of such persons to seek
refugee status was impermissible. The statute was not
ambiguous merely because it did not expressly preclude
spouses from relief. As we explained, a ―statute‘s silence on
a given issue does not confer gap-filling power on an agency
unless the question is in fact a gap–an ambiguity tied up with
the provisions of the statute.‖ Id. at 156 (internal quotation
omitted).
We rejected a similar statutory argument in De LeonOchoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 353 (3d Cir. 2010).
Petitioners who sought temporary protected status under the
INA contended that their parents‘ residency could satisfy the
continuous residency requirements. They argued that the
statute was ambiguous because the ―statute does not explicitly
permit or disallow it and therefore there is no ‗plain
meaning.‘‖ Id. We rejected this argument and held that the
relevant provision was not ―‗ambiguous‘ merely because it
does not expressly forbid every possible mechanism for
functional – but not actual – satisfaction of statutory
requirements. Else, near every statute would be ‗ambiguous‘
and courts would have unfettered freedom to fashion creative
mechanisms for satisfying the otherwise clear requirements
mandated by Congress.‖ Id.
The same holds true here. Although we refrain from
conjecturing that Congress‘ failure to specifically exclude a
limitation is never sufficient by itself to create ambiguity, we
conclude that, in this case, there is no statutory ―gap‖ that
warrants the regulation. See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 240 (―We
defer to an agency‘s efforts to fill statutory gaps, not to create
them, and in this instance Congress left no gap to fill when it
empowered the agency to consider all motions to reopen filed
by an alien, not just those filed by aliens who remain in the
United States up to the time of decision.‖); Rosillo-Puga, 580
F.3d at 1163 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (―Under the
[government‘s] approach, Chevron would require that
14

Congress expressly enumerate all that an agency cannot do
before we may conclude that Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. The [government] would thus
preclude customary expression of Congressional intent by the
use of expansive and inclusive permissions such as those in §
1229a(c)(6)(A) and (7)(A).‖) (internal quotation omitted).
In addition to the plain and empowering language of
the motion to reopen/reconsider provisions, the statute
contains other compelling evidence of Congress‘ clear intent.
See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2008)
(―At step one, we consider the text and structure of the statute
in question.‖); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (―The meaning–or
ambiguity–of certain words or phrases may only become
evident when placed in context.‖).
The text of IIRIRA makes clear that Congress
considered exceptions to or limitations on the right to file a
motion to reopen/reconsider and did, in fact, include some
limitations. See Dada, 554 U.S. at 14 (―The Act, to be sure,
limits in significant ways the availability of the motion to
reopen.‖). For example, as discussed above, in 1996
Congress codified the regulation that imposed time and
numerical restrictions. Congress also codified the
requirement that motions to reopen be based on new evidence.
See id. at 13-14. As the Supreme Court has explained,
―[w]hen Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not
follow that courts have authority to create others. The proper
inference . . . is that Congress considered the issue of
exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set
forth.‖ United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000).
That inference is particularly strong when, as here, Congress
specifically codified other regulatory limitations already in
existence. Congress did not codify the post-departure bar
notwithstanding its long history. Neither we nor the agency
should be permitted to override Congress‘ considered
judgment.9
9

The government attempts to refute this analysis by
15

arguing that Congress was aware of the regulatory
post-departure bar when it passed IIRIRA and failed to
specifically revoke it. Ergo, argues the government,
Congress implicitly left its imprimatur on the
regulation. The government urges that we follow
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Schor, where
the Supreme Court held that ―when Congress revisits a
statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative
interpretation without pertinent change, the
congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency‘s
interpretation is persuasive evidence that the
interpretation is the one intended by Congress.‖ 478
U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).
This argument fails for two reasons. First, in
IIRIRA, Congress did not merely revisit a preexisting
statute ―without [making] pertinent change[s].‖ As
outlined, Congress made significant changes, codifying
some regulations while ignoring others. In such a
situation, the Schor presumption lacks logical force,
and Congress‘ nuanced consideration of which
limitations and regulations to codify offers stronger
evidence of Congress‘ intent than does Congress‘
alleged ―silence‖ with respect to the pre-existing postdeparture regulation. As the Supreme Court has
explained in rejecting this very argument in a similar
context, ―[t]here is an obvious trump to the
reenactment argument, however, in the rule that where
the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not
constitute an adoption of the previous administrative
construction.‖ Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121
(1994) (internal quotation and alteration omitted).
Second, as noted by the Sixth Circuit in Pruidze,
when Congress passed IIRIRA in 1996, ―there was no
statutory provision [regarding motions to
reopen/reconsider] to ‗revisit.‘ Until then, Congress
had not spoken about motions to reopen[/reconsider]
and thus it had said nothing that could give rise to an
16

Moreover, as evident from the statutory post-departure
bar to judicial review that existed from 1961 until 1996,
Congress knew how to codify post-departure limitations, but
chose not to do so in 1996 when it significantly revised the
immigration landscape. IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612
(repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a). See Jama v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (―We do not
lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text
requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our
reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such
a requirement manifest.‖); Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 156 (―Had
Congress wished to extend [the statute], it could easily have
[done so].‖).
By repealing the post-departure bar to petitions for
review before courts of appeals, IIRIRA gave aliens greater
opportunity for review of deportation orders than they had
previously. This is consistent with IIRIRA‘s dual objectives
―to expedite the physical removal of those aliens not entitled
to admission to the United States, while at the same time
increasing the accuracy of such determinations.‖ Coyt, 593
F.3d at 906. Congress could not have intended to undermine
the second part of that goal—accuracy in determinations—by
preventing aliens from filing motions for review with the BIA
post-departure while simultaneously allowing aliens to seek
even higher review with courts of appeals. As the Supreme
Court has noted, ―[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional
possibilities but of statutory context.‖ Brown v. Gardner, 513
agency interpretation that Congress could codify. The
Attorney General had adopted the departure bar in
accordance with his then-unlimited authority over
motions to reopen.‖ 632 F.3d at 240. Indeed, even the
First Circuit, which upheld the post-departure bar to IJ
reopening, noted that ―[t]he government‘s insistence
that the Attorney General‘s interpretation was the one
intended by Congress [based on Schor] may be
overreaching.‖ Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 443.
Accordingly, the Schor presumption does not control.
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U.S. 115, 118 (1994). In this case, the context provided by
Congress‘ repeal of the statutory post-departure bar to judicial
review provides additional clarity regarding Congress‘ intent.
An attempt to reconcile the post-departure bar with the
time allowances for filing motions to reopen/reconsider
reinforces the conclusion that Congress‘ intent is clear and
that the regulation is invalid. Congress provided each alien
with the right to file one motion to reconsider within 30 days
of the final order of deportation and one motion to reopen
within 90 days. The government is required to remove an
alien from the United States within 90 days of the final order
of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). As the Ninth
Circuit has explained, ―[i]t would completely eviscerate the
statutory right to reopen provided by Congress if the agency
deems a motion to reopen constructively withdrawn whenever
the government physically removes the [alien] while his
motion is pending before the BIA.‖ Coyt, 593 F.3d at 907.
See also Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239, 244-45 (6th Cir.
2009) (holding that the post-departure bar to appeals from the
IJ to the BIA is inapplicable when the petitioner is forcibly
removed during the pendency of his appeal). As we held in
Barrios v. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2005), ―it is
contrary to congressional intent to allow aliens to file motions
to reopen but afford them no reasonable opportunity to
receive a ruling on the merits.‖ Similarly, if aliens are
permitted to file motions to reconsider but are then removed
by the government before the time to file has expired, the
right to have that motion adjudicated is abrogated.
Another portion of the statute further cements the view
that the post-departure bar regulation conflicts with the
statutory right to file motions to reopen/reconsider. In 2000,
Congress enacted a special rule that exempted victims of
domestic violence from the time limit on filing motions to
reopen. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. B, § 1506(c), 114 Stat.
1464, 1528 (2000) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)). In 2005, Congress restricted the
exception so that it only applied ―if the alien is physically
18

present in the United States at the time of filing the motion.‖
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, §
825(a)(2)(F), 119 Stat. 2960, 3063-64 (2006) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV)). There would be no need to
provide such a requirement if motions to reopen could not be
filed once the alien was outside of the country.
Congress‘ requirement that domestic violence victims
must remain in the United States to file their motions to
reopen out of time stands in contrast to Congress‘ failure to
provide a physical presence requirement for all aliens timely
filing a motion to reopen/reconsider. We turn to the canon of
statutory construction that where Congress ―includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.‖ Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation omitted). If we uphold the
regulation and find that physical presence in the United States
is required before any motion to reopen/reconsider can be
filed, we ―would render the physical presence requirement
expressly written into [the domestic abuse subsection] mere
surplusage.‖ William, 499 F.3d at 333. And it ―is a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.‖ TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)
(internal quotation omitted).
The government attempts to downplay the significance
of the physical presence requirement in the domestic violence
exception in two ways. First, it notes that the domestic
violence physical presence language was added to the statute
after IIRIRA was originally enacted. This is of no moment.
Irrespective of when the language was added, it is present
now and we should not read it out of the statute.
Second, the government claims that the domestic
violence exception was enacted as part of larger legislation
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relating to domestic violence and therefore does not speak to
Congress‘ intent regarding the post-departure bar. The
Supreme Court has specifically noted that ―the meaning of
one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where
Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically on
the topic at hand.‖ Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. at 133. That is precisely what occurred here. When
Congress amended the domestic violence exception, it was
undoubtedly aware of the whole text of the statute, saw that
there was no physical presence requirement generally, and
decided to include such a requirement as a prerequisite to
harnessing the exception.
In summary, the post-departure bar regulation conflicts
with Congress‘ clear intent for several reasons. First, the
plain text of the statute provides each ―alien‖ with the right to
file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider.
Second, the importance and clarity of this right has been
emphasized by the Supreme Court in Dada. Third, Congress
specifically considered and incorporated limitations on this
right and chose not to include the post-departure bar, despite
its prior existence in regulation. Fourth, the post-departure
bar would eviscerate the right to reopen/reconsider by
allowing the government to forcibly remove the alien prior to
the expiration of the time allowance. Fifth, Congress
included geographic limitations on the availability of the
domestic violence exception, but included no such limitation
generally. Sixth, Congress specifically withdrew the statutory
post-departure bar to judicial review in conformity with
IIRIRA‘s purpose of speeding departure, but improving
accuracy. The regulatory post-departure bar to BIA motions
to reopen/reconsider, if permitted, would undermine those
dual objectives and conflict with the clear intent of Congress.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the decision
of the BIA and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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